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ABSTRACT 
When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also show 
that the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article we 
include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the cultural 
transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observation 
and imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed to 
implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supporting 
fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that may 
account for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. It 
also explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher 
redistribution in their destination country. 
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1 Introduction
When studying redistributive attitudes, in a departure from traditional economics, surveys
show that individuals do care about fairness (Fong, 2001 ; Corneo and Grüner, 2002 ; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2005 ; Corneo and Fong, 2008 ; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). More specically,
they underline that people tend to support greater redistribution if they believe that poverty is
caused by factors beyond an individuals control, such as luck. The nding that social concerns
matter in explaining redistributive attitudes is also supported by a growing number of lab ex-
periments (Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006 ; Ackert et al., 2007 ; Hörisch, 2010 ; Durante et al.,
2014). Putting this nding into an international context, Corneo (2001) shows that individuals
in high-redistributive countries such as former West Germany exhibit a greater concern for fair-
ness than individuals in low-redistributive countries such as the United States1. Furthermore,
Luttmer and Singhal (2011) and Alesina and Giuliano (2011) show that, after controlling for
individual characteristics, immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribu-
tion continue to give signicant support to higher redistribution in their destination country.
Accordingly, the intensity of the concern for others appears to some degree to be culturally
shaped at young ages and to stop changing after reaching adulthood2. Understanding the deve-
lopment of an agents preferences when young and the role of the cultural context are then of
great importance in explaining individual demands for redistribution, and hence the diversity
1Twenge et al. (2007) explain for example that social exclusion elicits strong negative feelings that impair
the capacity for empathic understanding of others, and as a result, decreases pro-social behaviour (see Gunther
Moore et al., 2012, and Will et al., 2015, for neuroimaging evidence). To that extent, it is to be expected, as
found in Corneo (2001), that fairness considerations are undermined in societies with high social exclusion (the
poverty rate in 2013 was more than 17% in the United States compared with less than 10% in all the major
euro area countries, except Italy ; OECD, 2017), and in turn that these countries do not promote redistributive
policies ghting social exclusion. Note that the poverty rate is the ratio of the number of people whose income
falls below the poverty line taken as half the median household income of the total population.
2Supporting this view, psychologists McCrae and Costa (1994) have shown that personality traits stop
changing after age 30. See Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) for a discussion.
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in redistributive policies in democratic countries.
Following robust empirical evidence that fairness and culture are two important components
of redistributive attitudes, in this article we propose a mechanism for the cultural transmission of
the strength of the moral norm or concern for distributive justice. Through oblique socialization,
taste is shaped by the observation, imitation3 and internalization of cultural practices. More
specically, we argue that the observation during childhood of redistributive policies that are
far from what would be perceived as fair results in a weakened concern for distributive justice.
To characterize the socialization process and the persistence of preferences over generations,
deviating from the norm a¤ects preferences with a delay of one generation. The moral cost of not
supporting fair taxation is reduced when observing how the previous generation has collectively
failed to implement a fair institution. Said di¤erently, our mechanism states that being exposed
to unfairness during youth reduces individual responsibility regarding moral duty.
As a rst result of our mechanism for intergenerational and cultural transmission, assuming
that the level of redistribution perceived as fair is higher than the level selshly preferred, we
explain that immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to
support higher redistribution in their destination country because they have a stronger concern
for distributive justice. This result is also consistent with the ndings of Corneo (2001). As
a second result, the persistent di¤erences in redistribution between the United States and
Europe are explained through multiple stable stationary states. Indeed, we show that if people
are socialized in an environment where practices and institutions are close to (but lower than)
what is perceived as fair, the redistributive institution and the concern for fairness co-evolve and
are self-reinforcing such that the cultural transmission process ends with the implementation
of the high redistribution level. By contrast, if people are socialized in an environment that is
too far from what is perceived as fair, then observation that the moral norm does not prevail
3In the evolutionary literature, learning from others by imitation is a cheap and e¢ cient way to acquire
locally relevant information for adaptation. Accordingly, the propensities to learn and to imitate are part of an
evolved psychology shaped by natural selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1985 ; Boyd et al., 2011).
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in the society reduces individual responsibility regarding moral duty. In that case, the cultural
transmission process ends with the implementation of the low redistribution level. At steady
state, our model satisfyingly reproduces the fact that redistribution is higher in (continental)
Europe than in the United States while market income inequality appears lower in the former.
This paper belongs to several strands of literature. At the micro level, it is related rst to the
literature on the interaction between social norms and individual behavior, which stresses that
the incentive to behave in a certain manner depends on the degree to which we see others acting
in this way. For example, in the literature on crime (see Funk, 2005), the strength of the social
crime norm is measured by the moral costs that arise from committing a crime. Therefore, as is
well established in this literature, if it is observed that many others are committing crimes, the
remorse or guilt felt from breaking the social norm is weakened. In the same vein, in Lindbeck
et al. (1999) the individual guilt and social stigma linked to living on benets decreases with
the number of beneciaries in the society. In contrast with Funk (2005) and Lindbeck et al.
(1999), in our setting the choice is not binary. Therefore, to identify the deviation from the
moral norm we replace the fraction of deviators by the distance of the collective choice from
the norm. This makes it possible to apprehend the intensity of the deviation from the norm
more properly. In this rst strand of literature, the social inuence is generally associated with
contemporaneous peer e¤ects. It is thus distinguished from the growing literature on cultural
transmission launched by Bisin and Verdier (2001), where culture refers to social norms that
persist over long periods and across generations. On the relationship between culture and
institutions investigated in this second strand of literature4, our paper is most closely related
to the work of Tabellini (2008). Here individuals respond to incentives but are also inuenced
by norms of good conduct inherited from earlier generations. This leads to multiple history-
dependent steady states. If a norm of generalized morality initially prevails, then the economy
converges to a steady state with high cooperation, and vice versa. Tabellini (2008) focuses on
4Algan and Cahuc (2009) and Alesina et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between the labor market
institutions and respectively the civic virtue and the family values.
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the transmission of values within the family (vertical socialization). In our paper, by assuming
highly homogenous values at the regional level, parents have few incentives to transmit their
values. We therefore specically investigate the e¤ect of the social environment in transmitting
values (oblique socialization), taking into account that this cultural transmission channel cannot
account for any behavioral persistence beyond the rst generation of immigrants.
Finally, at the macro level, our paper also builds on the literature and extends the canonical
model of Meltzer and Richard5 (1981) to improve its main prediction that greater income in-
equality results in greater redistribution a prediction that has only weak support in the data6.
By stressing the importance of the concern for fairness, our approach is most closely related
to the seminal paper of Alesina and Angeletos (2005). However, the mechanism we propose is
structurally di¤erent. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Americans are supposed to support only
weak redistribution because they believe that market outcomes are fair, i.e. determined by hard
work rather than luck7. Indeed, in their framework, as the after-tax return to e¤ort is expected
to be high, they work hard and the market outcomes are e¤ectively fair 8. In other words, in
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) di¤erences in redistribution are sustained because beliefs about
5Its three dimensions have been extended : economic (Bénabou, 2000 ; Desdoigts and Moizeau, 2005 ; de Frei-
tas, 2012 ; Bredemeier, 2014), political (Roemer 1998 ; Rodriguez, 2004 ; Iversen and Soskice, 2006 ; Campante,
2011) and behavioral (Bénabou and Ok, 2001 ; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006 ; Lind, 2007 ; Shayo, 2009 ; Cervelatti
et al., 2010 ; Lindqvist and Östling, 2013). See Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Campante (2011) and Acemoglu et
al. (2013) for overviews.
6See Perotti (1996), Gouveia M. and Masia (1998), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), de Mello and Tiongson
(2006), and Iversen and Soskice (2006).
7Using World Values Survey data, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) highlight that 54% of Europeans
versus 30% of Americans believe that luck rather than e¤ort determines income.
8Note that there is no consensus on the view that market outcomes are fairer in the US than in Europe.
Certainly, as reported by Alesina and Angeletos (2005), the average worked time per employee is lower in Europe
than in the US. However, nothing seems to support the popular belief that American society is more mobile than
European societies. Björklund and Jäntti (1997) even show that intergenerational income mobility in Sweden is
higher than in the United States. Piketty (1995) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) then explore the role of biased
beliefs about social mobility to explain di¤erences in redistribution.
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fairness are self-fullled. In contrast, in our approach, the di¤erences are sustained because the
concern for fairness is endogenous and culturally shaped. The mechanism we propose provides
then a new explanation for the huge and persistent di¤erence in redistribution observed bet-
ween Europe and the United States based on the intergenerational and cultural transmission
of the strength of the concern for fairnesss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present in section 2 an endogenous mecha-
nism for the formation of preferences based on oblique socialization. In section 3, based on this
mechanism and assuming that the perception of the fair level of taxation is exogenous and una-
nimously shared in the population, we show that our model exhibits multiple stable stationary
states consistent with the negative correlation between income inequality and redistribution
encountered in the data. We also explain why immigrants from countries with a preference for
greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country. In
section 4, we extend and verify the robustness of our results by considering endogenous and
heterogenous views of what is fair. We conclude briey in the last section.
2 The social determinants of preferences
To characterize the socialization process, we consider an overlapping generations model in
which each individual lives two periods : childhood and adulthood. People are educated and
socialized during childhood, and through this process they internalize the cultural practices
that will inuence their behavior when they become adults. As adults, they work and consume
in order to maximize their utility. Adult individuals also vote on income redistribution in the
beginning of the period. In this way, they take into account the distortive e¤ect of redistribution
on work e¤ort, as in the seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard (1981).
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2.1 Inequity aversion
As underlined in the introduction, an abundant literature shows that peoples demand for
redistribution reects that they do indeed care about the equity of market income distribution,
where factors beyond ones control such as luck characterize the level of unfairness. Accordingly,
following Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006), we
assume that the income of an adult at date t is determined conjointly by luck and by e¤ort
such that :
yit = Aieit + i (1)
where eit denotes the persons chosen e¤ort, Ai  0 his talent or ability and i his luck (or bad
luck). It is assumed that fAi; eitg are private information to agent i. i is assumed unknown
before the income distribution and such that E0 [i] = 0, Ai and i being independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) across agents. In other words, when deciding his work e¤ort, an
individual knows its return but can not know if he will be lucky or not. After the income
distribution, i is assumed to be private information to agent i. We then associate any market
income distribution at date t with a distribution perceived as fair by the population and with
an optimal linear redistributive tax rate  f 2 [0; 1] that would allow implementing the fair
income distribution. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005), this level of redistribution is obtained
endogenously and is at the basis of the multiplicity of equilibria. In contrast, for the clarity of
our purposes, we will consider rst that the level of redistribution perceived as fair is exogenous
and unanimously shared in the population. We will investigate the limits of these assumptions
in section 4. We then consider an extended version of the Bolton-Ockenfels model (2000) of
distributive preferences in specifying the utility function as follows :
Uit = uit   't
 
 f    t
2
(2)
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where uit denotes the private utility from personal consumption and the work e¤ort, and 't  0
the strength of the concern for fairness or inequity aversion that we assume was shaped during
childhood.
Assuming as in Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007) that childrens
consumption is part of their parentsconsumption, we then specify the private utility as follows :
uit = cit   e
2
it
2
(3)
where cit denotes household consumption (one adult - one child) at date t. The quadratic
disutility of e¤ort is for analytical simplicity. At each period t, the government redistributes
the income according to a simple scal scheme characterized by a at-rate tax  t and a lump-
sum benet provided to all adults. Assuming a balanced budget, each adult faces the following
budget constraint :
cit = yit (1   t) +  tyt (4)
where yt denotes the mean income at date t.
2.2 Oblique socialization
To incorporate social forces into individual behavior, one privileged way is by considering
the formation of agentspreferences9. Preferences are to some degree socially determined, so
that agents internalize preferences that reect the cultural practices of the society that they
inhabit. Through oblique socialization, young individuals internalize, by imitation and learning,
preferences that will inuence their behavior when they become adults, which will explain the
persistence of the cultural practices.
Assume then that the distributive preferences of an individual youth at date t   1 are
inuenced by the observation of the social environment and its degree of fairness. Denoting by
9See Postlewaite (2011) for an overview of the di¤erent approaches in the economic literature linking indivi-
dual behaviors and social environment.
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 t 1 the e¤ective level of taxation at date t   1 while  f is the level perceived as fair, we can
characterize the social environment by the social distance to distributive justice
St 1 =

 f    t 1
2
(5)
The higher St 1, the more unfair the redistributive system perceived by the population. As the
e¤ective level of taxation  t 1 results from a collective choice of the adults at date t 1 through
voting, a signicant St 1 reveals a low weight attached to the moral norm adherence and a
failure in implementing fair taxation. This low weight is therefore transmitted to the young
generation through observation and imitation. Having been exposed to unfairness during youth
reduces the concern for fairness. Denoting 't = (St 1), we will then assume in the following
that 0  0. Our mechanism is closely related to that of Lindbeck et al. (1999) and Funk (2005),
where the disutility of deviating from the norm is non-increasing in the fraction of deviators.
However, in our setting the choice is not a binary choice between working full-time or living o¤
benets, as in Lindbeck et al. (1999), or following the law or committing a crime, as in Funk
(2005). Therefore, to determine the deviation from the moral norm we replace the fraction
of deviators by the distance between the collective choice and the norm. In addition, in our
model, to characterize the socialization process, the impact on preferences of deviating from
the norm applies with a delay of one generation. The moral cost of not supporting fair taxation
is reduced when observing how the previous generation has collectively failed to implement
a fair institution. Note that, contrary to Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Bénabou and Tirole
(2006), the intergenerational cultural transmision mechanism that we underline occurs through
passive observation and imitation of society at large, not through active e¤orts of the parents
to transmit values. As highlighted by the empirical ndings of Dohmen et al. (2012), those two
aspects of the cultural transmission process are relevant in inuencing child attitudes.
In light of these preferences, in the following section we study the resulting individual
demands for redistribution and the policy that will be implemented in a democracy.
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3 Redistributive policies in democracies
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass 1 of individuals at each generation
endowed with utilities (2) and characterized by their specic e¤ort eit, their specic talent Ai
and their specic luck i. As already mentioned, Ai and i are i.i.d across agents. The optimal
e¤ort resulting from the maximization of the expected utility E0t [Uit] is as follows :
eit = Ai (1   t) (6)
As redistribution lowers the market return to e¤ort, it reduces the e¤ort. In addition, as the
return to e¤ort grows with ability, more talented individuals work harder. Considering eq. (6),
the pre-tax income (1) of an adult at date t can be rewritten as :
yit = ai (1   t) + i (7)
where ai = A2i . As the level of e¤ort is reduced by redistribution, obviously the pre-tax income
is also reduced.
3.1 The individual demands for redistribution
Consistently with our behavioral assumptions, an adult at date t will support the level of
redistribution that maximizes his utility. Assuming that the vote occurs at the beginning of
the period allows the person to take into account the distortive e¤ect of redistribution on work
e¤ort and then on income. Accordingly, considering that he can fully anticipate his future e¤ort
choice as a function of the tax rate, the expected utility (before knowing his particular luck)
dened by eqs. (2) and (3) can be written, using eqs. (4), (6) and (7), as :
E0t [Uitj eit ( t)] = ai (1   t)
2
2
+  ta (1   t)  't
 
 f    t
2
(8)
where a denotes the mean ai. Dening the demand for redistribution of an individual as the
level of taxation that maximizes his utility (8) leads then to the following rst order condition
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 ai (1   t) + a (1   t)    ta + 2't
 
 f    t

= 0. Therefore, as long as the second order
condition ai   2a   2't  0 is satised, knowing that 't = (St 1), individual demands for
redistribution at date t can be expressed as :
 it =
8><>:
a ai+2(St 1)f
2a ai+2(St 1)
0
if ai   a  2 (St 1)  ft
otherwise
(9)
Considering the second order condition, assuming maxi faig  2a is then a su¢ cient condition
so that preferences are single-peaked in  t.
Individual demands for redistribution as specied in eq. (9) decrease with personal income,
@ it
@ai
 0, and increase with the level of redistribution perceived as fair, @ it
@f
 0. By exhibiting
both selsh and fair motives, eq. (9) is consistent with empirical surveys (Fong, 2001 ; Corneo
and Grüner, 2002 ; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005 ; Corneo and Fong, 2008 ; Alesina and Giuliano,
2011).
Eq. (9) also reects the fact that adultsdemands for redistribution at date t are a¤ected
by the cultural environment in which they have grown up. More specically, if the level of
redistribution perceived as fair by an individual of type i is higher than the level of redistribution
he would have chosen under the selsh motive, then the degree of unfairness in the environment
when young will lower his demand for redistribution :  f  a ai
2a ai

maxifaig2a
, @ it
@St 1  0.
Denote by a;t the demand for redistribution of an individual of talent a at date t, and  sainf =
a ainf
2a ainf the level of redistribution chosen under the selsh motive by the least talented individuals 
as ainf  0,  sainf  12

. It then follows from eq. (9) that :
Proposition 1  f   sainf and  t 1   f yields @a;t@t 1  0 8a ( 2a).
Following Proposition 1, if the fair level of redistribution is higher than the level selshly
preferred for all individuals
 
 f   sainf

and if the level of redistribution observed when young
is lower than the fair level
 
 t 1   f

, the specic e¤ect of being an immigrant coming from
a high redistribution country is then to support greater redistribution compared to native
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individuals with the same talent a. Indeed, consider two representative individuals of talent a
who have grown up at date t   1 in two di¤erent countries D and F characterized by  Dt 1 
 Ft 1   f , everything else being equal. In that case, according to Proposition 1 we will observe
F;Da;t  D;Da;t , where x;za;t is the demand for redistribution of an adult of talent a at date t
living in country z and having grown up in country x. From this perspective, if assuming
 f   sainf and  t 1   f , the demands for redistribution as expressed in eq. (9) are consistent
with the empirical ndings of Guiso et al. (2006), Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Luttmer
and Singhal (2011). Di¤erently, assuming  f <  sainf

while  t 1   ft 1

would mean that
less able immigrants, those whose levels of redistribution selshly preferred are above the fair
level, from countries with a preference for greater redistribution would tend to support fewer
redistribution compared to native individuals with the same talent. Indeed, as they have been
exposed to less unfairness during their youth, their concern for fairness is stronger and they
promote the fair level of redistribution that is less than the one selshly preferred. Assuming
 f   sainf and  t 1   f is also consistent with the ndings of Corneo (2001). Individuals in
high-redistributive countries such as former West Germany exhibit a greater concern for fairness
than individuals in low-redistributive countries such as the United States.
Two assumptions that have been made to obtain these results deserve attention. First, we
assume that adult individuals vote on income redistribution in the beginning of the period, be-
fore deciding on their e¤ort. Otherwise, i.e. if individuals do not take into account the distortive
e¤ect of redistribution on their work, it is well known that the selsh poorer-than-average indi-
vidual (yit  yt) supports a full income redistribution because he anticipates earning more from
redistribution ( tyt) than he contributes ( tyit). If the same poorer-than-average individual is
purely fair ('t ! +1), he supports the taxation rate  f . In that case, it is easy to show that,
still assuming  t 1   f (< 1), the result turns out to be in contradiction with empirical evi-
dence for a signicant part of the population :
@yityt;t
@t 1
 0. Second, unlike in our assumption,
if individuals could have known from the beginning whether they will be lucky or not, a lucky
individual, by being wealthier, would have supported less redistribution. From this perspective,
12
our assumption does not alter the qualitative result at the individual level while making the
analysis at the collective level easier.
3.2 The majority rule
We now assume that, in a democracy, any policy to be implemented must be supported
by a majority10. In our model, under the su¢ cient condition maxi faig  2a, preferences are
single-peaked in  t. Thus the median-voter theorem applies. It follows from eq. (9) that the tax
rate selected under majority rule can be expressed as11  t =
a am+2(St 1)f
2a am+2(St 1) , where am denotes
the median ai. Denote by  = a am an aggregate index of income inequality12, and normalize
am = 2 (without loss of generality). Assuming that the distribution of (squared) talents ai is
skewed to the right yields   0 (so that the median income is lower than the average income
as observed). Denote by  s = 
2(1+)
the tax rate selected under majority rule if individuals
were driven only by their self-interest, i.e. if 't = 0. This selsh tax rate exhibits the standard
Meltzer-Richard e¤ect : as income inequality rises, the median voter is poorer compared with
the average, and then supports greater redistribution : d
s
d
 0. However, as noted in the
introduction, income inequality is a poor predictor of redistributive policies. Di¤erently, with
fair motives, the dynamics of redistribution under majority rule can be expressed as a convex
combination of the purely interested and the purely intuitively fair tax rates such that :
 t+1 = t
s + (1  t)  f (10)
where t =
1+
1++(St) 2 [0; 1),  0  0 and 0 = 1+1++[f 0]2 given. t provides a measure of
the proximity of the redistributive tax to the purely interested level (relatively to the purely
fair level). From that perspective, it is worth noting that the proximity of the redistributive tax
10As put forward by Corneo and Neher (2014), democracies implement to a large degree the level of redistri-
bution demanded by the median voter.
11We implicitly assume that an immigrant of the rst generation cannot vote in his new country.
12In the empirical literature investigating the link between redistribution and income inequality, the Gini
coe¢ cient or the interdecile ratios are often favored to measure income inequality.
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to the purely interested level increases as income inequality increases, @t
@
> 0, and decreases
as the concern for fairness increases, @t
@
< 0. Assuming  s <  f then yields :
Proposition 2 If ' = (S) is su¢ ciently high when   approaches  f and su¢ ciently low
when   approaches  s, there exist multiple stable stationary states  SS 2

 s;  f

.
To explain this result, note that using eq. (5) we can redene eq. (10) as  t+1 = 	(

t ),
where 	( t )  1+
1++

[f t ]
2
 s +

1  1+
1++

[f t ]
2


 f 2  s;  f,  0 =  0  0 given,
and 	0  0 as long as  t   f . Stationary states, dened by   = 	( ), then lie necessarily
between the selsh and fair tax rates :   2  s;  f. In addition, stable stationary states are
the ones where the graph of 	 cuts the main diagonal from above, and unstable ones are those
where it cuts it from below. Knowing that  s  	( s) and  f > 	   f yields that there exits
at least one stable stationary state  SS 2

 s;  f

. As exhibited in eq. (10), such a stable statio-
nary state is as close to the fair tax rate as the concern for fairness ' is high. Reciprocally, by
assuming that being exposed to unfairness during youth reduces the concern for fairness, the
mechanism we are exploring states also that the concern for fairness increases as the tax rate
becomes fairer : ' = 

 f    2 where 0  0. Therefore, if lim
!f ; <f


 f    2
is su¢ ciently high, there exists a stable stationary state close to the fair taxation. At the li-
mit lim
!f ; <f


 f    2 = +1, it can be shown that  SS !  f   SS <  f. Reasoning
similarly, it is obvious that a stable stationary state is as close to the selsh tax rate as the
concern for fairness ' is low. If ' = 0, the unique stable stationary state is characterized by
 SS = 
s. Therefore, if lim
!s+


 f    2 is su¢ ciently low, there exists a stable statio-
nary state close to the selsh taxation. Accordingly, if both lim
!f ; <f


 f    2 and
lim
!s+


 f    2 are respectively su¢ ciently high and low, there exist at least two stable
stationary states. Indeed, as the graph of 	 crosses the diagonal an odd number of times which
may be greater than 3, the number of stable stationary states may be greater than 2 (we do
not consider here the non-generic case of uncountable many crossings).
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Fig. 1 Multiplicity and history dependence of redistribution
If we want to restrict our attention to the case with only two stable stationary states, we need
to assume, in addition, if  is of class C2, that the equation 	0 () = 1 has two roots in
 
 s;  f

.
Take for example the following function  (S) = 
+S , where  and  are two strictly positive
parameters. As is obvious, the concern for fairness ' = 
+[f ]2
is high when   approaches
 f if 

is high, and low when   approaches  s <  f if  is low. More formally, denoting
^
(f s)2
= 1+
4
and assuming 0 <   ^, then there exists ^ > 0 such that if 0 <   ^ the
model exhibits two stable stationary states US and EU , where  s < US < EU <  f (see
Appendix B). Compared with Proposition 2, the condition  (S) is su¢ ciently high when  
approaches  f corresponds to   ^ (and then 

su¢ ciently high) and the condition  (S) is
su¢ ciently low when   approaches  s to   ^. If we exclude an initial taxation  0 = ~ 13,
where ~ is the unstable stationary state, we can then verify that the dynamics of redistribution
is history-dependent if both   ^ and   ^ (Fig. 1).
13If considering that 0 is continuously distributed over [0; 1] or

0; f

, the event 0 = ~ has a probability of
zero.
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As illustrated in Figure 1, if at date t = 0 people are socialized in an environment where
practices and institutions are close to but su¢ ciently lower than what is perceived as fair,
 0 = 
EU
0 2
 
~ ; EU

, then the level of taxation increases at date t = 1,  1 >  0, such that
the perceived unfairness of the institutions decreases,

 f    1
2
<

 f    0
2
. The generation
that is young at date t = 1 is socialized in an environment that is closer to the fair institution
than was the previous generation. Hence, by being exposed to less unfairness, their concern for
fairness increases and they will support an institution that will be closer to fairness at date t = 2.
This cultural transmission process ends with the implementation of the high redistribution level
characterized by the tax rate EU . The redistributive institution and the concern for fairness co-
evolve and are self-reinforcing such that lim
t!+1
 t = 
EU and lim
t!+1
't 1 = '. On the other hand,
if the initial taxation is too far from what is perceived as fair such that  0 = US0 2
 
US; ~

,
the process is reversed and the concern for fairness as well as the level of redistribution decrease
with time to stabilize towards their low levels lim
t!+1
 t = 
US <  f and lim
t!+1
't 1 = ' < '.
If the conditions for the existence of multiple stationary states are satised, persistent dif-
ferences in redistribution can exist over long periods, as they are linked to di¤erent preferences
for redistribution that are sustained by a process of cultural transmission. As underlined in
Proposition 1, if the level of redistribution chosen under the selsh motive by the least talented
individuals is lower than the level perceived as fair,  f   sainf , this may explain why immi-
grants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher
redistribution in their destination country. In addition, as a high level of redistribution lowers
the level of e¤ort in the economy, a high-redistribution country is characterized by a lower
level of income inequality. Our model then also provides a rationale for the negative correlation
between income inequality and redistribution that is encountered in the data.
Note importantly that all our results have been obtained while assuming exogenous, context-
independent and unanimously shared levels of redistribution that are perceived as fair. However,
as the level of e¤ort decreases with redistribution, as shown by Alesina and Angeletos (2005),
the importance of luck in the income determination increases, and we should observe a level
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of redistribution perceived as fair that is lower in the low-redistribution stationary state than
in the high-redistribution state. This suggests that the the fair level of redistribution depends
on the perception of the economic environment that is inuenced by the level of taxation. In
addition, due in particular to di¤erent concepts of distributive justice, it is likely that individuals
with similar information about the market outcomes will have di¤erent perceptions of the just
level of redistribution in the country. In the next section, we investigate whether incorporating
endogenous and heterogenous perceptions at the country level (ex post) and at the individual
level (ex ante) ts with our mechanism of cultural transmission so as to explain the di¤erences
in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.
4 Extensions
4.1 Endogenous perceptions
To characterize the level of redistribution that would be perceived as socially optimal, studies
show that individual merit is an important principle at both the individual and aggregate levels.
As shown by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) for example, the belief that luck rather than
e¤ort determines income is a strong predictor of the national level of redistribution. Accordingly,
by reducing the relative importance of luck in the income determination, more e¤ort should
lead to the perception of an income distribution whose unfairness requires a lower level of
redistribution. From that perspective, as redistribution lowers the market return to e¤ort and
reduces e¤ort as specied in eq. 6, one would then expect that the level of redistribution
perceived as fair under the merit principle increases with the redistributive tax to be such that
 ft  T f ( t), where dT fd  0, T f (0) > 0 and T f (1)  1.
However, having endogenous rather than exogenous perceptions does not call into question
the capacity of our mechanism to generate multiple stable stationary states. On the one hand,
following Proposition 2, if the concern for fairness ' = 
T f ( )   2 is su¢ ciently low
when the redistributive institution approaches the selsh level  s, there still exists a stable
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Fig. 2 Multiplicity and endogenous perceptions
stationary state close to the selsh taxation. On the other hand, when the concern for fairness
becomes high enough, maximizing utility (2) is close to minimizing the perceived unfairness of
the redistributive institution that is measured by
 T f ( t)   t2. Dene by ^ f a level of purely
fair redistributive taxation as a root of the equation  = T f (). It follows that if the concern
for fairness ' = 
T f ( )   2 is su¢ ciently high when   approaches ^ f , there exists
a stationary state close to ^ f . As illustrated in Fig. 2a in which T f () is assumed linear in
the tax rate  , ^ f >  s and  (S) = 
+S , the model continues to exhibit two stationary states
US < EU if  is low enough and 

is high enough (see Appendix C).
Having endogenous rather than exogenous perceptions implies that the higher the level of
redistribution, the higher the level of redistribution perceived as fair. If the model exhibits two
stable stationary states US < EU , it then yields T f  US < T f  EU. As a consequence, if
the level of redistribution selshly preferred by the least talented individuals is lower than the
level of redistribution perceived as fair in the low-redistribution country
 T f  US   sainf so
that Proposition 1 holds, endogenous perceptions also yield that, compared with the previous
section with identical and exogenous perceptions of the fair level of redistribution, an individual
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socialized when young in a high-redistribution country will support less redistribution if he
moves as an adult to a low-redistribution country (because the perceived inequity in the income
distribution appears lower), while still supporting a higher redistribution in his destination
country than do the natives.
Note that nonlinearities in the relationship between the level of redistribution perceived
as fair and the tax rate may increase the numbers of stable stationary states. This is most
obvious (but not necessary) if the equation  = T f () exhibits multiple roots ^ fj . Indeed,
if the concern for fairness ' = 
T f ( )   2 is su¢ ciently high when the level of un-
fairness associated with the redistributive institution measured by
T f ( )   2 approaches
zero, there exists a stationary state close to each root ^ fj . As illustrated in Figure 2b in which
the level of redistribution perceived as fair under the individual merit principle is dened as
T f () =
8><>:
^ finf
^ fsup
if   
otherwise
, where  s < ^ finf <  < ^
f
sup  1, and  (S) = +S , if  is low en-
ough and 

high enough the model now exhibits three stable stationary states US < G < F
(see Appendix C). However, if one considers that G and F characterize the high levels of
redistribution observed in Western Europe (for example public social spending amounts to
31:5% and 25:3% of GDP respectively in France and Germany in 2016 ; OECD 2017) and
US the low level observed in the United states (public social spending amounts to 19.3%
of GDP at the same date), this nonlinear case does not challenge our mechanism explaining
why individuals in high-redistribution countries exhibit a greater concern for fairness than in-
dividuals in low-redistribution countries. Indeed, we can see in Figure 2b that the countries
characterized by the high levels of redistribution G and F have a quite similar small distance
between their e¤ective taxation and the fair one,
T f  G  G2  T f  F   F 2, where
the distance
T f ()  2 reects the observed unfairness of the redistributive institution. To
that extent, the redistributive institution characterized by the low level US appears less fair,T f  US  US2 > T f  G  G2. In terms of our mechanism based on oblique socializa-
tion that states that being exposed to unfairness during youth reduces the concern for fairness,
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it means that the concern for fairness is lower in the low-redistribution country than in the
high-redistribution countries : 'US < '2fG;F g.
Note also that nonlinearities in the relationship between the level of redistribution perceived
as fair and the tax rate can generate multiple stationary states without our oblique socialization
e¤ect. For example, following eq. (10), there may exist two stationary states US =  s +
(1  ) ^ finf and EU =  s + (1  ) ^ fsup, where  = 1+1++' , if US   < EU . However, in
such a specication, it is the endogeneity of the fair tax perception that leads to multiplicity,
which is not the case of our mechanism as underlined by the exogenous or linear cases. In
addition, without our oblique socialization e¤ect, individuals in high-redistributive countries
do not exhibit a greater concern for fairness than do individuals in low-redistributive countries.
From these perspectives, our mechanism appears clearly di¤erent from the one proposed by
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) based on the endogeneity of the fair tax14.
4.2 Heterogenous perceptions
If individual merit appears to be an important principle to characterize the level of redistri-
bution that would be perceived as socially optimal, its content may give rise to interpretation
and then be perceived di¤erently from one individual to another. Certainly, e¤ort and hard
work are associated with individual merit. Certainly, luck is seen as a unfair component of in-
come. However, as noted by Schokkaert and Truyts (2014), income di¤erences caused by ability
or talent may be seen more or less fair according to whether talent is perceived as reecting
former investments in human capital or as innate and then beyond an individuals control. This
ambiguity is revealed by several studies whose ndings are contradictory. For example, Fong
14Abstracting from expectations, the tax level perceived socially as fair in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) is
dened as T f () = argmin 02[0;1]
R
i

udi   ufi
2
di

, where ufi = Aiei ()  ei()
2
2 denotes the level of utility
perceived as fair for an adult of type i, and udi = [Aiei () + i] (1   0) +  0Aie ()   ei()
2
2 the e¤ective level
of utility after redistribution. This then yields T f () = 
2

2+(1 )22a
, where 2 and 
2
a denote respectively the
variance of  and a. If asuming
2
2a
 14 , equation  = T f () exhibits two or three roots and their model can
have two stable stationary states if ' is large enough.
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(2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002) show on American data that individuals who think that
income is determined by luck rather than individual e¤ort and ability are more favorable to
redistribution. In the same line, Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2014) show in the lab that merit
is attributed only if e¤ort or ability a¤ect the outcome. By contrast, Isaksson and Lindskog
(2009) show that in Denmark individuals who believe that people get rewarded for their abi-
lity and talent are more favorable to redistribution. These contradictory ndings may suggest
that the deservingness of income related to talent or ability can be perceived di¤erently across
individuals and across societies.
In addition, individual merit cannot sum up all the principles of distributive justice (see
Konow, 2003, for an overview). Forsé and Parodi (2006) show for example that European
countries share an identical hierarchy of moral principles : rst, the guarantee of basic needs ;
second, merit ; and less important, equality of income. Besides, Durante et al. (2014) show
that social concerns with respect to redistribution include both the concern for fairness and a
dislike of ine¢ ciency that can be associated with the "greatest aggregate happiness", i.e. the
utilitarian concept of social justice most closely associated with Bentham (see Konow, 2003).
These ndings suggest that the principle characterized by "everyone should get what they
deserve" can conict with other moral concepts in dening a socially just redistribution15.
To the extent that the content of merit may be perceived di¤erently from one individual to
another and that di¤erent concepts of distributive justice may lead to the denition of di¤erent
socially just levels of redistribution, it is likely that individuals with similar information about
the market outcomes will have di¤erent perceptions of the just level of redistribution in the
country. Accordingly, escaping from the assumption that the perception of the fair redistributive
tax is unanimously shared in the population, assume that di¤erent perceptions may exist across
15In recent years, a great deal of literature has showed experimentally for example that conicts between
deontological principles (considering that the right to get what one deserves is a principle that should be
applied to everyone belongs to a deontological conception of justice) and utilitarianism are a general feature of
moral thinking (see Greene, 2008 ; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008 ; Cushman and Young, 2009).
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individuals16. More specically, abstracting from the endogeneity of perceptions (see section
4.1), assume that  fi is i.i.d across individuals, i.e. that each individual is associated with a
perception  fi irrespective of his own income
17. The social distance between the perceived social
optimal tax rate and the chosen one at date t, St =
R
i
h
 fi    t
i2
di, can then be expressed as :
St = 2f +

 f    t
2
(11)
where  f and 2
f
denote respectively the mean and the variance of  fi . 
2
f
provides a measure
of the degree of collective agreement to dene  f as the norm of fair redistribution. If 2
f
= 0,
the perception of  f as the fair redistribution is unanimously shared in the society. This is the
case studied in section 3. By contrast, if 2
f
is high,  f is of low signicance in the population
for dening a shared norm of fair level of redistribution. Therefore, everything else being equal,
the social distance between the perceived social optimal tax rate grows with the variance of  fi .
How does it impact our results ? If the distributions of ai and 
f
i are both symmetrical, the
pivotal voter is the individual with the mean talent a and the mean perception  f (see Di Tella
and Dubra, 2013). The dynamics of redistribution is then written exactly as in eq. (10), except
that  s = 018 and that the fair level of redistribution previously shared unanimously is replaced
by its mean  f . Following Proposition 2, the guarantee to obtain multiple stable stationary
states requires then that the concern for fairness be su¢ ciently high when the redistributive
institution approaches the level reecting the collective norm of fairness  f . Therefore, as the
diversity of perceptions measured by 2
f
increases the social distance to distributive justice and
then lowers the concern for fairness, a too high 2
f
may prevent the existence of multiple stable
stationary states19. The existence of multiple stationary states driven by our mechanism does
16In our setting all voters are equally concerned for others. Therefore, the heterogeneity we examine is di¤erent
from the one in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2010) in which a mixture of fair and selsh voters is considered.
17Supporting this assumption, Piketty (2003) has shown on French data that on average low-income and
high-income individuals have similar socially-optimal levels of income inequality.
18In that case,  s = 0 and the model can no longer exhibit the Meltzer-Richard e¤ect.
19For example, if  (S) = +S , it yields straightforwardly from the proof in Appendix B that, if 0 <   ^,
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not rely on the assumption that the perception of the fair redistributive tax is unanimously
shared in the population, i.e. 2
f
= 0, even if the degree of collective agreement to dene  f as
the norm of fairness must be high enough.
Note that if  fi 2 [0; 1], we can no longer assert that coming from a high-redistribution coun-
try is a su¢ cient condition to support a higher redistribution. In particular, if we consider an
individual of type

ai; 
f
i = 0

, the more intense the persons concern for distributive justice,
the lower the support for redistribution. However, after controlling for observable individual
characteristics, only types
 
ai; 
f

are considered. Therefore, we only need to assume that, on
average, the level of redistribution perceived as fair is greater than the level of redistribution sel-
shly preferred by the least talented individuals,  f   sainf , to be consistent with the empirical
literature.
5 Conclusion
If it is accepted that humans are driven solely by self-interest, Meltzer and Richard (1981)
show that the level of redistribution in a democratic society is increased by inequality in the
income distribution. However, this result has only weak support in the data. In this paper,
we argue that the failure of the canonical model is due in part to its behavioral assumptions.
Departing from traditional economics, empirical studies and individual surveys show that indi-
viduals do care about fairness in their demand for redistribution. These studies also show that
the cultural environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects their preferences about redistri-
bution. We include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to propose
a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the
young are partially shaped through observation and imitation of otherschoices in a way that is
consistent with oblique socialization. More specically, observing during childhood how adults
the model exhibits two stable stationary states US and EU such that  s (= 0) < US < EU < f only if
2f  ^   .
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have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern for fairness
when adult or the moral cost of not supporting a fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, and
assuming that the perception of the fair level of taxation is exogenous and unanimously shared
in the population, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that
may account for the huge and persistent di¤erences in redistribution observed between Europe
and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with a high preference
for redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country. These
results have been shown to be robust for extended specications of the perception of the fair
level of taxation, in particular if they are heterogenous across individuals.
In the specications that we have used, we have rst considered childhood only as a pas-
sive period during which individuals are socialized and internalize cultural practices. However,
childhood is also a crucial period during which individuals can actively invest in their human
capital through e¤ort at school. Knowing that e¤ort at school depends on the expected re-
turn, which is negatively impacted by the future level of redistribution, introducing education
explicitly in our model would result in a dynamic of redistribution that is driven not only by
history but also by expectations. Second, we have considered socialization only through pas-
sive observation and imitation of the society at large (oblique socialization), and not through
active e¤orts of the parents to transmit their values (vertical socialization). As mentioned in
the introduction, by assuming highly homogenous values at the regional level in most of the
article, oblique socialization is highly e¢ cient so that parents have few incentives to transmit
their values. However, in the last subsection 4.2, we have stressed that individuals could use
di¤erent concepts of distributive justice to dene their fair level of redistribution. From these
perspectives, incorporating both investment in human capital and vertical socialization in the
present analysis appears to be a promising avenue for further research.
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Appendix A. Proof of Propositions
Proposition 1
From eq. (9) it follows that the preferred tax rate of an individual of talent a is as follows :
a;t =
8><>:
a a+2(St 1)f
2a a+2(St 1)
0
if a  a  2 (St 1)  f
otherwise
Accordingly, as St 1 =

 f    t 1
2
(eq. 5), it yields :
@a;t
@ t 1
=
8><>:
 40 (2a  a) 
f  a a
2a a
(2a a+2(St 1))2

 f    t 1

0
if a  a  2 (St 1)  f
otherwise
As  f   sainf yields  f  a a2a a 8 (ainf ) a  2a, it follows that if  f   sainf and  t 1   f ,
@a;t
@t 1
 0 8 (ainf ) a  2a.
Proposition 2
In the text.
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Appendix B. The case with  (S) = 
+S
Let us dene  (S) = 
+S and t = 
f    t the di¤erence between the mean fair and the
e¤ective level of taxation. Assuming rst that  = 0, the dynamics of redistribution expressed
by eq. (10) can be rewritten as :
t+1 =
1 +
1 ++ 
2t
 
 f    s (12)
and stationarity is then dened by :
3     f    s 2 + 
1 + 
 = 0 (13)
If 
(f s)2
 1+
4
, eq. (13) exhibits three real roots 1 = 0, 

2 =
f s+
q
(f s)2  41+
2
and
3 =
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
.
In addition, as 1+
1++ 
2t
 
 f    s is continuous and monotonous in 2t , as @
"
1+
1++ 
2t
(f s)
#
@2t

0, and as lim
2t!0
@
"
1+
1++ 
2t
(f s)
#
@2t
= 0, if 
(f s)2
 1+
4
, there exist two stable stationary states
characterized by
dt+1dt   1 which are  = 1 and  = 2, where  s = 2(1+) and  = a am. In
addition, if 0 6= 3, as long as j0j <
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
, lim
t!1
t = 

1, otherwise lim
t!1
t = 

2.
Equivalently, as t =  f  t , we can assert that assuming (f s)2 
1+
4
,  0 6= ^ =  f 3, if
 0 2

 f   3;  f + 3

then H = lim
t!1
 t = 
f , otherwise L = lim
t!1
 t =
1
2

 f +  s  
q
( f    s)2   4
1+

,
H > L.
Besides, the dynamic process exhibits only one stationary state L if  is large enough such
that lim
!+1
 = 1, lim
!+1
L = 
s.
As @
@
> 0 and lim
!f
 = 0, it follows that if 
(f s)2
 1+
4
there exists ^ > 0 such that
if 0 <   ^ the model exhibits two stable stationary states US and EU , where  s < US <
EU <  f . Dening the dynamics as  t+1 = 	(

t ), ^ can be characterized by lim
!^
	0
 
EU

= 1
whereas lim
!0;>0
	0
 
EU

= 	0
 
 f

= 0.
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Appendix C. Endogenous perceptions
The linear case
Dene T f () =  f +

1  f
^f

 , where 0 <  f < ^ f  1, ^ f being the only root of the
equation  = T f ().
In that case, utility (2) becomes Uit = uit 't
 T f ( t)   t2 = uit 't  f + 1  f^f   t    t2.
Dening 't =

f
^f
2
't allows us to rewrite utility as Uit = uit   't
 
^ f    t
2
, i.e. as if ^ f
was an exogenous fair level of redistribution unanimously shared in the population. There-
fore, it goes straightforwardly that the dynamics of redistribution can be expressed according
to eq. (10) as  t+1 = t
s +

1  t

^ f , where t =
1+
1++(St) 2 [0; 1), 

0 =  0  0 given,
 (St) =

f
^f
2
 (St).
Knowing that St =
 T f ( t)   t2 =  f^f 2  ^ f    t2, if  (S) = +S , it follows that
 (St) = +S , where  =

^f
f
2
. Accordingly, we deduce from Appendix B that if 0 <   ^
then there exists ^ > 0 such that if 0 <   ^ the model exhibits two stable stationary states
US and EU , where  s < US < EU < ^ f , as illustrated in Fig. 2a.
The nonlinear case
Dene  (S) = 
+S and assume that 
f = ^ fj . It follows (see Appendix B) that if 0 <
  ^j, where ^j = 1+4

^ fj    s
2
, then there exists ^ > 0 such that if 0 <   ^ the
model exhibits two stable stationary states USj and 
EU
j , where 
s < USj < 
EU
j < ^
f
j ,
lim
!0;>0
USj =
1
2
 
^ fj + 
s  
r
^ fj    s
2
  4
1+
!
and lim
!0;>0
EUj = ^
f
j .
Consider now that perceptions are dened as T f () =
8><>:
^ finf
^ fsup
if   
otherwise
, where  s <
^ finf <  < ^
f
sup  1. Therefore, if  is low enough and  low enough (such that  is high
enough), there are four potential stable stationary states that are USinf , 
US
sup, 
EU
inf and 
EU
sup.
However, we deduce from
@ lim
!0;>0
USj
@^fj
= 1
2

1  ^
f
j sq
(^fj s)
2  4
1+

< 0

^ fj > 
s

that, if  is
low enough, then USsup < 
US
inf < ^
f
inf <  : 
US
sup cannot be a stationary states associated with
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the fair level of redistribution ^ fsup. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 2b, if  is low enough
and  low enough (such that 

is high enough), the model exhibits three stable stationary
states US = USinf , 
G = EUinf and 
F = EUsup where 
s < US < G < ^ finf < 
F < ^ fsup. Note
that the observed levels of unfairness in the two high-redistribution countries are as follows :
lim
!0;>0

^ finf   G
2
= lim
!0;>0
 
^ fsup   F
2
= 0.
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